Grecia, en el atolladero, nosotros también

Los cuervos croan sobre el cadaver de Grecia, esperando que caigan otros  cadaveres más recientes.  

Cuando empezó la crisis , hace 8 años, me sorprendió que la mayoría de la gente buscaba culpables, sea en los deudores, sea en los acreedores. Y siguen en ello. Candidatos culpables no faltan. El gobiernen de ZP, no el de Mariano, no: la culpa la tiene el español medio, o no: la culpa la tiene la "casta".

Todo esto no tiene sentido, porque el culpabilizado, sea quien sea, es incapaz de pagar la factura.

Grecia es un país que desde su nacimiento, cuando se independizó de Turquía allá por el XIX, ha vivido endeudado. La primera deuda que incumplió fue la que le permitió montar un ejército que luchó por la independencia.

Ahora Grecia tiene una deuda impagable: un 180% de PIB. Poco a poco, los mandamases europeos se dan cuenta que el FMI tiene razón, que nunca se cobrarán esas deudas, y que será mejor admitir una quita y reestructuración temporal de los pagos.

Los gráfico siguientes, del FT, muestran la razón de por qué la duda de Grecia es incobrable.

El primero: la deuda griega llegara al 300% de PIB en 2060 si no se recorta, pero sería del 100% del PIB en determinadas condiciones de reestructuración.

El segundo, muestra cómo se dispararia el servicio anual de la deuda con y sin reestructuración.

¡Más de un 60% del PIB en 2060 para mantener el servicio de deuda (intereses y amortizaciones)!

Se acaba de filtrar, hace menos de una hora, un documento confidencial del FMI donde expone sus argumentos a favor de una quita. De este breve documento extraigo él escenario básico y las propuestas de reestructuración.

A) . BASELINE SCENARIO ASSUMPTIONS

•  The primary balance reaches 11⁄2 percent of GDP by 2018 and stays the same thereafter. This is in line with cross-country evidence of maintaining primary surpluses for prolonged periods.
•  GDP grows above potential in the medium term as it rebounds from a low base. It settles at the long-run potential rate of 11⁄4 percent suggested by demographics, capital accumulation and TFP growth (which is assumed to rise to the euro-area average).
•  The GDP deflator converges to the ECB target and the euro area average of 2 percent.
•  Market interest rates vary endogenously with the level of debt ratio (about 1 bp change for each 1 ppt change in the debt ratio). The starting rate—reflecting a risk-free rate of 1-
  11⁄2 percent and a risk premium of 43⁄4 -51⁄4 percent—is comparable to that faced by Greece in 2014 and Italy and Spain in 2011-12.
•  Official interest rates gradually converge to 3.8 percent, consistent with long-run averages of yields on AAA rated securities.
•  Given the high level of NPLs and weak quality of capital, additional bank capital needs are projected to emerge, which could be covered from the unused bank buffer in the ESM program (up to €20 billion).
•  Privatization proceeds are projected at €5 billion during 2015-2030 (€2 billion until 2018).

 Other financing needs include clearance of arrears (€7 billion) and rebuilding cash buffers (€7.7 billion).

•  Payment deferrals: Principal and interest payments on all European loans (GLF, EFSF, ESM) should be deferred until at least 2040 as follows:
  •  Extension of the grace period on repayments of EFSF loans by up to 17 years, ESM loans by up to 6 years, and GLF loans by 20 years. This is expected to reduce amortization payments by about 5 percent of GDP during 2020-2040 (from 13 to 8 percent of GDP).
  •  In addition, the current deferral of interest payments on non-PSI EFSF loans should be extended by a further 17 years, and interest payments on GLF, ESM and PSI-related EFSF loans should also be deferred by 24 years. This is expected to reduce Greece’s interest burden by 41⁄2 percent of GDP during 2016-2040 (from 6 to 11⁄2 percent of GDP).
  •  To minimize the need for upfront fiscal transfers, the stock of deferred interest will be remunerated at a new lower fixed interest rate for the duration of the loan (see below).
•  Maturity extensions: The maturity of European loans should be extended as follows: (i) for GLF loans by 40 years from 2040 to 2080; (ii) for EFSF loans by up to 24 years from 2056 to 2080; and (iii) for ESM loans by 20 years from 2060 to 2080. This will help to keep gross financing needs below 20 percent by 2060.
•  Fixing the interest rate: For EFSF/ESM loans, the interest rate should be fixed at a maximum level of 1.5 percent at least until 2045; for GLF loans, the spread over Euribor (50 bp) should be eliminated. This can be achieved via a combination of exchanging ESM short-term bonds with new long-term ones and engaging in interest-rate swaps. Given the size of the European loans to Greece, these operations would have to be executed gradually during the program period. To the extent that market-based solutions are not possible, other ways should be found to transfer the interest rate risk from Greece to member states. The reduction in interest rate is critical to allow for a debt reduction of 30 percent of GDP by 2040 and 70 percent by 2060, and for a reduction in GFN by 4 percent by 2040 and 14 percent by 2060.

 Delivery: The details of the debt relief package would need to be agreed upfront. The delivery will need to be comprised of an upfront component and a conditional component based on policy implementation (at each end-year review). All relief contingent on broad policy implementation will need to be delivered by the end of the program period, in line with the Fund’s objective that the country should not be dependent on official assistance.

Como vimos ayer, medio mundo está endeudado con el otro medio.

No veo otra salida que una negociación global por el bien de todos, deudores, acreedores, y futuras generaciones.