La caída de la banca europea ¿pronostica recesión inminente?

En todo caso, observen que la distancia entre la línea roja y azul aumenta cuando la acosas van mal. Fíjense en la zona gris de la crisis. 

RE: veo que mi valoración coincide con la de M.A. Paz Viruet atolladero su último post. 

yo creo que para España bajadas de sueldos, como no tenemos divisa..,

La caida de la libra nos abocará a bajadas de sueldos? Mas deflacion?, mas de lo mismo,jajaja

Porque claro desde luego a la chepa de los britanicos no nos subimos ni locos.jajaja

Simplemente mas ostias para España Portugal, Grecia, Italia,nos toca cargar con todo, y ademas como buenos cristianos, jajaja, nos van violar por todos los sitios,jajaja

De momento Mario Draghi señala que la demanda de crédito sigue creciendo. Y esto sería cuando la banca ya lleva tiempo declinando.

Lo que si estoy observando es; que con lo que está cayendo, el miedo general, la acumulación de dinero en bonos carísimos y demás calamidades muchas cotizaciones las están arrastrando por los suelos. Cuando por fin digan a dar el cambio, éste no va a ser pausado. Será una vertical. 

Esto es la transcripción de las preguntas y respuestas de la conferencia del BCE del pasado día 21, cuando hablaron de la banca. Lo que viene a decir es que el BCE le da mucha importancia a la cotización de las acciones bancarias.

Question: So far banks have suffered most from Brexit, it seems. They are very important for the transmission of monetary policy, so do you see maybe there's some need to act?

My second question is concerning – at the moment bond purchases are linked to the capital key. Would you change that within the near future?

Draghi: I'll answer the first question. You're right, banks are important. Especially important for the eurozone, which is basically a bank-based economy, where the credit intermediation goes mostly through the bank lending channel. Bank equities in the aftermath of the Brexit were especially hit, and especially in the eurozone, and especially those banks with a high share of NPLs, of non-performing loans. Bank equity prices are of some significance for policymakers, because if they drop in the way they did, one would assume, if this is to stay, cost of capital would increase, and therefore the net return on lending would decrease and would suggest on the banking side a more conservative lending behaviour. That's why we do care about bank equity prices for the transmission of our monetary policy.

But let's consider this in a little more, I would say the right perspective, but also the medium-term perspective. On the solvency side our banks are better, if not much better, than they were before. Let me give you one number: the average CET1 – the CET1 for the 130 banks directly supervised by the SSM – was 9% in 2012, and it's around 13% today. So from a solvency viewpoint one would conclude that a series of actions that have been undertaken in the last three, four years – like new regulation, supervision, a robust supervisory system and regulatory design; but also a new harmonised standard of classification of NPLs, and certainly substantial provisioning against these NPLs and other forms of weak parts of the balance sheet; and finally the role that our monetary policy played in this period of time – these are the reasons why banks are today better, if not much better, than they were in 2009.

So what is the problem? The problem now that we will have to address is the weak profitability ahead, not a problem of solvency. As you know, next week, on 29 July, the EBA will publish the outcome of the most recent stress tests for 51 banks in the European Union, including 37 significant institutions directly supervised by the SSM. Moreover, the SSM has conducted the same stress test for an additional 56 banks under its direct supervision. And these stress tests will be one input to determine the Pillar 2 supervisory capital demands by the end of this year.

So then, what about the NPLs? We've said that the NPLs are certainly a significant problem for the future profitability, and for the capacity, the ability that the banks have of lending. So it is a problem that needs to be addressed because it's an obstacle to the transmission of monetary policy. One would say that the solution of the NPL problem is based on three pillars. First of all, a consistent supervisory approach. Second, the development of a fully-functioning NPL market. And third, government action, and first of all passing that legislation that would foster the development of an NPL market. And this certainly involves a revision of existing personal and corporate bankruptcy legislation, but also other actions, and possibly also having a public backstop when at times of exceptional circumstances the NPL market is not well functioning, and certainly we want to avoid fire sales.

As regards the second question: the answer is no. We had no discussion about that. No attention was given to that.